Neste contexto, o termo fingerprint se refere àquilo que é específico do Tails na forma como se comporta na Internet. Isto pode ser usado para determinar se um usuário específico está usando Tails ou não.

As explained on our warning page, when using Tails it is possible to know that you are using Tor. But Tails tries to make it as difficult as possible to distinguish Tails users from other Tor users, especially users of Tor Browser outside of Tails. If it is possible to determine whether you are a user of Tor Browser inside or outside of Tails, this provides more information about you and in consequence reduces your anonymity.

Esta seção explica algumas questões relacionadas à fingerprint do Tails e como isto pode ser usado para identificar você como um usuário Tails.

Para os sítios web que você está visitando

Os sítios web que você está visitando podem conseguir um monte de informações sobre seu navegador. Estas informações podem incluir o nome e versão do navegador, tamanho da janela, lista de extensões disponíveis, fuso horário, fontes disponívels, etc.

To make it difficult to distinguish Tails users, Tor Browser in Tails tries to provide the same information as Tor Browser on other operating systems in order to have similar fingerprints.

Tails includes the uBlock Origin extension which removes advertisements. If an attacker can determine that you are not downloading the advertisements that are included in a webpage, that could help identify you as a Tails user.

No special care is taken regarding the fingerprint of the Unsafe Browser.

Para seu provedor de serviços de Internet ou administrador da rede local

  • Bridges de Tor são na maior parte do tempo uma boa forma de esconder de um observador local o fato de que você está se conectando ao Tor. Se isto for importante para você, leia nossa documentação sobre modo bridge.

  • A Tails system is almost exclusively generating Tor activity on the network. Usually users of Tor Browser on other operating systems also have network activity outside of Tor, either from another web browser or other applications. So the proportion of Tor activity could be used to determine whether a user of Tor Browser is using Tails or not. If you are sharing your Internet connection with other users that are not using Tails it is probably harder for your ISP to determine whether a single user is generating only Tor traffic and so maybe using Tails.

  • Tails does not use the entry guards mechanism of Tor. With the entry guard mechanism, a Tor user always uses the same few relays as first hops. As Tails does not store any Tor information between separate working sessions, it does not store the entry guards information either. This behaviour could be used to distinguish Tails users across several working sessions.

  • When starting, Tails synchronizes the system clock to make sure it is accurate. While doing this, if the time is set too much in the past or in the future, Tor is shut down and started again. This behavior could be used to distinguish Tails users, especially since this happens every time Tails starts.