Sie brauchen

1 USB-Stick

Only for Tails!

8 GB minimum

Ihr Tails

1 USB-Stick

8 GB minimum

All data will be lost!



It is currently impossible to manually upgrade a Tails USB stick while running from itself. This scenario requires creating an intermediary Tails on another USB stick, from which to upgrade your Tails.

Windows 7

or later

macOS 10.10

or later


any distribution



or another derivative

another Tails

USB stick or DVD

2 GB of RAM


Intel processor

not Apple M1 or M2

2 GB of RAM


Ein Smartphone

oder einen Drucker,
to follow the instructions

1 hour in total

½ hour

¼ hour

1.3 GB to download

½ hour to install

½ hour to upgrade

Detailed system requirements and recommended hardware.


  • Tails works on most PC computers that are less than 10 years old.
  • Tails works on some older Mac computers with an Intel processor.
  • Tails does not work on newer Mac computers with an Apple processor (M1 or M2).
  • Tails might not work on:
    • Some older computers, for example, if they don't have enough RAM.
    • Some newer computers, for example, if their graphics card is incompatible with Linux.
    • "Gaming" graphics cards like Nvidia or AMD Radeon, which are often incompatible.

See our list of known hardware compatibility issues.

Hardware requirements

  • A USB stick of 8 GB minimum or a recordable DVD.

    All the data on this USB stick or DVD will be lost when installing Tails.

  • The ability to start from a USB stick or a DVD reader.

  • A 64-bit x86-64 compatible processor:

    • IBM PC compatible but not PowerPC nor ARM.
    • Tails works on some older Mac computers with an Intel processor.
    • Tails does not work on newer Mac computers with an Apple processors (M1 or M2).
    • Tails does not work on 32-bit computers since Tails 3.0 (June 2017).
    • Tails does not work on phone or tablets.
  • 2 GB of RAM to work smoothly.

    Tails can work with less than 2 GB RAM but might behave strangely or crash.

Recommended hardware

Laptop models evolve too rapidly for us to be able to provide an up-to-date list of recommended hardware. Below are some guidelines if you, or your organization, are considering acquiring a laptop dedicated to running Tails.

For PC

  • Avoid "gaming" models with Nvidia or AMD Radeon graphics cards.
  • Consider buying a refurbished laptop from a high-end (professional) series. These are cheaper and will last longer than new but lower-quality laptops.
    • For example, the Lenovo ThinkPad series work well with Tails, including the X250, X1 Carbon, T440, T480, and T490 models.
    • If you live in a part of the world where buying refurbished laptops is uncommon, look on eBay and Amazon. Amazon offers a 90-day Amazon Renewed Guarantee.
  • Consider buying a new laptop from vendors who guarantee the compatibility with Linux and Tails like ThinkPenguin.

For Mac

Unfortunately, we don't know of any Mac model that works well in Tails and can run the latest macOS version.

Ihre Schritte

Warnings: Tails is safe but not magic!

Tails is safer than any regular operating system. But Tails, or any software or operating system, cannot protect you from everything—even if they pretend to.

Die folgenden Empfehlungen werden Sie noch sicherer halten insbesondere, wenn Sie einem großen Risiko ausgesetzt sind.

Schützen Sie ihre Identität wenn Sie Tails verwenden.

Tails wurde entwickelt, um Ihre Identität zu verbergen.

Aber einige Ihrer Aktivitäten könnten Ihre Identität preisgeben:

  • Das Teilen von Dateien mit Metadaten, so wie Datum, Uhrzeit, Standort und Geräteinformationen
  • Tails für mehr als einen Zweck zur gleichen Zeit benutzen
Protecting your identity

Limitationen des Tor Netzwerks

Tails nutzt das Tor-Netzwerk, weil Tor das stärkste und beliebteste Netzwerk ist, um vor Überwachung und Zensur zu schützen.

Aber Tor hat Grenzen, wenn Du Dir Sorgen machst über:

  • Verbergen, dass Du Tor und Tails nutzt
  • Protecting your online communications from determined, skilled attackers
Limitations of Tor

Reduzieren Sie das Risiko, wenn Sie unsichere Computer nutzen.

Tails kann gefahrlos auf einem Computer ausgeführt werden der ein Virus hat.

Aber Tails kann die nicht immer schützen, zum Beispiel bei:

  • Installieren von Tails von einem infizierten Computer
  • Tails auf einem Computer mit einem kompromittierten BIOS, Firmware oder Hardware ausführen
Using untrusted computers

Schutz Ihrer Identität bei der Verwendung von Tails

Löschen Sie die Metadaten von Dateien, bevor Sie sie teilen

Viele Dateien beinhalten versteckte Daten oder Metadaten:

  • JPEG und andere Bilddateiformate beinhalten oftmals Informationen darüber, wo ein Bild aufgenommen wurde und welche Kamera benutzt wurde.

  • Office-Dokumente beinhalten oftmals Informationen über den Autor, das Datum und die Uhrzeit, wann das Dokument erstellt wurde.

To help you clean metadata, Tails include Metadata Cleaner, a tool to remove metadata in a wide range of file formats.

Metadata has been used in the past to locate people from pictures they took. For an example, see NPR: Betrayed by metadata, John McAfee admits he's really in Guatemala.

Use Tails sessions for only one purpose at a time

If you use Tails sessions for more than one purpose at a time, an adversary could link your different activities together.

For example, if you log into different accounts on the same website in a single Tails session, the website could determine that the accounts are used by the same person. This is because websites can tell when 2 accounts are using the same Tor circuit.

To prevent an adversary from linking your activities together while using Tails, restart Tails between different activities. For example, restart Tails between checking your work email and your whistleblowing email.

We are not aware of any such attacks to deanonymize people online who used Tails for different purposes at a time.

If you worry that the files in your Persistent Storage could be used to link your activities together, consider using a different Tails USB stick for each activity. For example, use one Tails USB stick for your activism work and another one for your journalism work.

Einschränkungen des Tor-Netzwerks

Tails macht deutlich, dass Sie Tor und wahrscheinlich Tails verwenden

Alles, was Sie im Internet von Tails aus tun, geht über das Tor-Netzwerk.

Tor and Tails don't protect you by making you look like any random Internet user, but by making all Tor and Tails users look the same. It becomes impossible to know who is who among them.

  • Your Internet service provider (ISP) and local network can see that you connect to the Tor network. They still cannot know what sites you visit. To hide that you connect to Tor, you can use a Tor bridge.

  • The sites that you visit can know that you are using Tor, because the list of exit nodes of the Tor network is public.

Parental controls, Internet service providers, and countries with heavy censorship can identify and block connections to the Tor network that don't use Tor bridges.

Many websites ask you to solve a CAPTCHA or block access from the Tor network.

Exit nodes can intercept traffic to the destination server

Tor hides your location from destination servers, but it does not encrypt all your communication. The last relay of a Tor circuit, called the exit node, establishes the actual connection to the destination server. This last step can be unencrypted.

A Tor
connection goes through 3 relays with the last one establishing the actual
connection to the final destination

The exit node can:

  • Observe your traffic. That is why Tor Browser and Tails include tools, like HTTPS Everywhere, to encrypt the connection between the exit node and the destination server, whenever possible.

  • Pretend to be the destination server, a technique known as machine-in-the-middle attack (MitM). That is why you should pay even more attention to the security warnings in Tor Browser. If you get such a warning, use the New Identity feature of Tor Browser to change exit node.

Warning: Potential Security Risk

To learn more about what information is available to someone observing the different parts of a Tor circuit, see the interactive graphics at Tor FAQ: Can exit nodes eavesdrop on communications?.

Tor exit nodes have been used in the past to collect sensitive information from unencrypted connections. Malicious exit nodes are regularly identified and removed from the Tor network. For an example, see Ars Technica: Security expert used Tor to collect government e-mail passwords.

Adversaries watching both ends of a Tor circuit could identify users

An adversary, who could control the 3 relays in a circuit, could deanonymize Tor users.

Tor chooses 3 relays that belong to 3 different network operators for each circuit.

Tails takes extra measures to use different circuits for different applications.

The Tor network has more than 6 000 relays. Organizations running Tor relays include universities like the MIT, activist groups like Riseup, nonprofits like Derechos Digitales, Internet hosting companies like Private Internet Access, etc. The huge diversity of people and organizations running Tor relays makes it more secure and more sustainable.

A powerful adversary, who could analyze the timing and shape of the traffic entering and exiting the Tor network, might be able to deanonymize Tor users. These attacks are called end-to-end correlation attacks, because the attacker has to observe both ends of a Tor circuit at the same time.

No anonymity network used for rapid connections, like browsing the web or instant messaging, can protect 100% from end-to-end correlation attacks. In this case, VPNs (Virtual Private Networks) are less secure than Tor, because they do not use 3 independent relays.

End-to-end correlation attacks have been studied in research papers, but we don't know of any actual use to deanonymize Tor users. For an example, see Murdoch and Zieliński: Sampled Traffic Analysis by Internet-Exchange-Level Adversaries.

Reduzieren sie die Risiken, wenn sie unsichere Computer nutzen

Installieren Sie Tails von einem Computer dem Sie vertrauen

Tails schützt sie vor Virusen und Malware auf ihrem normalen Betriebssystem, weil Tails unabhängig von anderen Betriebssystemen arbeitet.

Aber die Tails Instanz geht möglicherweise kaputt wenn sie es von einem kompromittierten Betriebssystem installieren. Diese Tipps reduzieren die Risik:

  • Installieren sie Tails unbedingt von einem sauberen Betriebssystem. Zum Beispiel von einem Computer ohne Virus oder klonen sie Tails von einem Freund, dem sie vertrauen.

  • Do not plug in your Tails USB stick while another operating system is running on the computer.

  • Nutzen sie ihren Tails USB-Stick nur um Tails auszuführen. Nutzen sie ihn nicht und Daten von oder zu einem anderen Betriebssystem zu transferieren.

Wenn sie denken, dass Tails kaputt sein könnte machen sie ein [manual upgrade von einem sicheren Betriebssystem.

Uns ist nicht bekannt, dass ein Virus existiert, der eine Tailsinstallation infizieren könnte, es wäre jedoch möglich, dass in der Zukunft einer erstellt werden könnte.

Kein Betriebssystem kann vor eventuellen Hardwareänderungen schützen.

Ihr Computer könnte kompromitiert sein, wenn seine physischen Komponenten verändert wurden. Wenn beispielsweise ein Keylogger physisch auf Ihrem Computer installiert wurde, könnten Ihre Kennwörter, persönlichen Informationen und andere auf Ihrer Tastatur eingegebenen Daten gespeichert und von einer anderen Person abgerufen werden, selbst wenn Sie Tails verwenden.

Try to keep your computer in a safe location. Hardware alterations are more likely on public computers, in internet cafés or libraries, and on desktop computers, where a device is easier to hide.

Wenn sie denken, das ein Computer möglicherweise modifiziert wurde, dann:

  • Nutzen sie einen Passwort Manager um sicher Passwörter einzufügen. So müssen sie das Passwort nicht tippen und es ist nicht im Klartext für z.B. für Kameras oder Leute die ihnen über die Schulter schauen zu erkennen.

  • Nutzen sie die Bildschirmtastatur, wenn sie einen öffentlichen Computer nutzen oder sie denken, dass er möglicherweise einen Keylogger haben könnte.

Keylogger sind einfach zu beschaffen und meistens nicht erkennbar. Ein Beispiel sehen sie hier: KeeLog: KeyGrabber forensic keylogger getting started.

Other hardware alterations are much more complicated and expensive to install. For an example, see Ars Technica: Photos of an NSA “upgrade” factory show Cisco router getting implant.

Kein Betriebssystem kann gegen BIOS oder Firmware Angriffe schützen.

Firmware umfasst das BIOS oder UEFI und andere Software, die in elektronischen Chips auf dem Computer gespeichert ist. Alle Betriebssysteme, einschließlich Tails, hängen von der Firmware ab, um zu starten und zu laufen, daher kann sich kein Betriebssystem vor einem Firmware-Angriff schützen. Genauso wie ein Auto von der Qualität der Straße abhängt, auf der es fährt, sind auch Betriebssysteme von ihrer Firmware abhängig.

Ihren Computer an einem sicheren Ort aufzubewahren kann Sie vor einigen Firmware-Angriffen schützen, aber einige andere Firmware-Angriffe können aus der Ferne durchgeführt werden.

Firmware-Angriffe sind demonstriert worden, sind aber kompliziert und teuer auszuführen. Wir wissen nichts von einer tatsächlichen Anwendung gegen Tails-Benutzer. Für ein Beispiel siehe: LegbaCore: Stehlen von GPG-Schlüsseln/E-Mails in Tails durch Ferninfektion der Firmware.

Because you always have to adapt your digital security practices to your specific needs and threats, we encourage you to learn more by reading the following guides:

Verify the Tails signing key

If you already certified the Tails signing key with your own key, you can skip this step and start downloading and verifying the USB image.

In this step, you will download and verify the Tails signing key which is the OpenPGP key that is used to cryptographically sign the Tails USB image.

To follow these instructions you need to have your own OpenPGP key.

To learn how to create yourself an OpenPGP key, see Managing OpenPGP Keys by Riseup.

This verification technique uses the OpenPGP Web of Trust and the certification made by official Debian developers on the Tails signing key.

  1. Import the Tails signing key in your GnuPG keyring:

    gpg --import < tails-signing.key
  2. Install the Debian keyring. It contains the OpenPGP keys of all Debian developers:

    sudo apt update && sudo apt install debian-keyring
  3. Import the OpenPGP key of Chris Lamb, a former Debian Project Leader, from the Debian keyring into your keyring:

    gpg --keyring=/usr/share/keyrings/debian-keyring.gpg --export | gpg --import
  4. Verify the certifications made on the Tails signing key:

    gpg --keyid-format 0xlong --check-sigs A490D0F4D311A4153E2BB7CADBB802B258ACD84F

    In the output of this command, look for the following line:

    sig!         0x1E953E27D4311E58 2020-03-19  Chris Lamb <>

    Here, sig!, with an exclamation mark, means that Chris Lamb verified and certified the Tails signing key with his key.

    It is also possible to verify the certifications made by other people. Their name and email address appear in the list of certification if you have their key in your keyring.

    If the verification of the certification failed, then you might have downloaded a malicious version of the Tails signing key or our instructions might be outdated. Please get in touch with us.

    The line 175 signatures not checked due to missing keys or similar refers to the certifications (also called signatures) made by other public keys that are not in your keyring. This is not a problem.

  5. Certify the Tails signing key with your own key:

    gpg --lsign-key A490D0F4D311A4153E2BB7CADBB802B258ACD84F

Download Tails

  1. Download the USB image:

    wget --continue

Verify your download

In this step, you will verify your download using the Tails signing key.

  1. Download the signature of the USB image:


  2. Verify that the USB image is signed by the Tails signing key:

    TZ=UTC gpg --no-options --keyid-format long --verify tails-amd64-5.17.1.img.sig tails-amd64-5.17.1.img

    The output of this command should be the following:

    gpg: Signature made Thu Sep 14 19:41:14 2023 UTC
    gpg:                using RSA key 05469FB85EAD6589B43D41D3D21DAD38AF281C0B
    gpg: Good signature from "Tails developers <>" [full]
    gpg:                 aka "Tails developers (offline long-term identity key) <>" [full]

    Verify in this output that:

    • The date of the signature is the same.
    • The signature is marked as Good signature since you certified the Tails signing key with your own key.

Install Tails using dd

  1. Make sure that the USB stick on which you want to install Tails is unplugged.

  2. Execute the following command:

    ls -1 /dev/sd?

    It returns a list of the storage devices on the system. For example:


  3. Plug in the USB stick on which you want to install Tails.

    All the data on this USB stick will be lost.

  4. Execute again the same command:

    ls -1 /dev/sd?

    Your USB stick appears as a new device in the list.

    /dev/sda /dev/sdb

  5. Take note of the device name of your USB stick.

    In this example, the device name of the USB stick is /dev/sdb. Yours might be different.

    If you are unsure about the device name, you should stop proceeding or you risk overwriting any hard disk on the system.

  6. Execute the following commands to copy the USB image that you downloaded earlier to the USB stick.


    • tails.img with the path to the USB image

    • device with the device name found in step 5

    dd if=tails.img of=device bs=16M oflag=direct status=progress

    You should get something like this:

    dd if=/home/user/tails-amd64-3.12.img of=/dev/sdb bs=16M oflag=direct status=progress

    If no error message is returned, Tails is being copied on the USB stick. The copy takes some time, generally a few minutes.

    If you get a Permission denied error, try adding sudo at the beginning of the command:

    sudo dd if=tails.img of=device bs=16M oflag=direct status=progress

    The installation is complete after the command prompt reappears.

Well done!

You have installed Tails on your USB stick.

In the next step, you will make your computer start on this USB stick.

Tails might not work on your computer, so good luck!

If you already started on the other Tails, go directly to step 3: Verify that the other Tails is up-to-date.

Open these instructions on another device

In the next step, you will shut down the computer. To be able to follow the rest of the instructions afterwards, you can either:

  • Scan this QR code on your smartphone or tablet:

  • Print these instructions on paper.

  • Take note of the URL of this page:

Restart on the intermediary Tails

Restart on the other Tails

Restart on your Tails USB stick

Make the computer start on the USB stick

  1. Make sure that you have installed Tails using either:

  2. Click on the Start button.

  3. Press and hold the Shift key while you choose Power ▸ Restart.

  4. In the Choose an option screen, choose Use a device.

    If the Choose an option screen does not appear, refer to the instructions on starting Tails using the Boot Menu key.

  5. In the Use a device screen, choose Boot Menu.

    Windows shuts down, the computer restarts, and a Boot Menu appears.

    Plug in your Tails USB stick shortly after choosing Boot Menu and while Windows is shutting down.

    In the future, we We recommend that you only plug in your Tails USB stick while Windows is shutting down. Otherwise, a virus in Windows could infect your Tails USB stick and break its security.

    Such an attack is possible in theory but very unlikely in practice. We don't know of any virus capable of infecting Tails. See our warning on plugging Tails in untrusted systems.

    The Boot Menu is a list of possible devices to start from. The following screenshot is an example of a Boot Menu:

  6. In the Boot Menu, select your USB stick and press Enter.

  7. If the computer starts on Tails, the Boot Loader appears and Tails starts automatically after 4 seconds.

    Black screen ('GNU
GRUB') with Tails logo and 2 options: 'Tails' and 'Tails (Troubleshooting

    • The Troubleshooting Mode entry disables some features of the Linux kernel and might work better on some computers. You can try this option if you think you are experiencing hardware compatibility errors while starting Tails.

    • The External Hard Disk entry makes it possible to start from an external hard disk and some problematic USB sticks.

Most computers do not start on the Tails USB stick automatically but you can press a Boot Menu key to display a list of possible devices to start from.

If Windows 8 or 10 is also installed on the computer, you can refer instead to the instructions on starting Tails from Windows 8 or 10. Starting Tails from Windows is easier than using the Boot Menu key.

The following screenshot is an example of a Boot Menu:

This animation summarizes how to use the Boot Menu key to start on the USB stick:

The following instructions explain in detail how to use the Boot Menu key to start on the USB stick:

  1. Make sure that you have installed Tails using either:

  2. Fahre den Compter herunter und lasse dabei den USB Stick eingesteckt.

    Shut down the computer and plug in the Tails USB stick.

    Fahren Sie den Computer herunter.

    Plug in the other Tails USB stick that you want to install upgrade from.

    Unplug your Tails USB stick while leaving the intermediary USB stick plugged in.

  3. Identify the possible Boot Menu keys for the computer depending on the computer manufacturer in the following list:

    AcerF12, F9, F2, Esc
    FujitsuF12, Esc
    LenovoF12, Novo
    SamsungEsc, F12, F2
    SonyF11, Esc, F10
    others…F12, Esc

    On many computers, a message is displayed very briefly when switching on that also explains how to get to the Boot Menu or edit the BIOS settings.

  4. Schalten Sie den Computer ein.

    Immediately press several times the first possible Boot Menu key identified in step 2.

  5. If the computer starts on another operating system or returns an error message, shut down the computer again and repeat step 3 for all the possible Boot Menu keys identified in step 2.

    If a Boot Menu with a list of devices appears, select your USB stick and press Enter.

  6. If the computer starts on Tails, the Boot Loader appears and Tails starts automatically after 4 seconds.

    Black screen ('GNU
GRUB') with Tails logo and 2 options: 'Tails' and 'Tails (Troubleshooting

  1. Make sure that you have installed Tails using either:

  2. Shut down the computer.

    Fahre den Compter herunter und lasse dabei den USB Stick eingesteckt.

    Plug in the other Tails USB stick that you want to install from.

  3. Plug in your Tails USB stick.

  4. Switch on the computer.

    Immediately press-and-hold the Option key ( or Altkey) when the startup chime is played.

    Hold the key pressed until a list of possible startup disks appears.

    'Option' or
'alt' key in the bottom left of Mac keyboard

  5. Choose the USB stick and press Enter. The USB stick appears as an external hard disk and might be labeled EFI Boot or Windows like in the following screenshot:

with the logo of an internal hard disk labeled 'Macintosh HD' and an
external hard disk labelled 'Windows' (selected)

    If the USB stick does not appear in the list of startup disks:

    1. Wait a few minutes. Some USB sticks need some rest after installing.
    2. Make sure that you have installed Tails using either:

    3. Make sure that you have verified your download of Tails.

    4. Make sure that you have verified your download.

    5. Try installing again on the same USB stick.

    6. Try installing on a different USB stick.

    7. Try using the same USB stick to start on a different computer.

    If your computer still does not display the Boot Loader, it might currently be impossible to start Tails on your computer.

  6. If your Mac displays the following error:

    Security settings do not allow this Mac to use an external startup disk.

    Then you have to change the settings of the Startup Security Utility of your Mac to authorize starting from Tails.

    To open Startup Security Utility:

    1. Turn on your Mac, then press and hold Command(⌘)+R immediately after you see the Apple logo. Your Mac starts up from macOS Recovery.

    2. When you see the macOS Utilities window, choose Utilities ▸ Startup Security Utility from the menu bar.

    3. When you are asked to authenticate, click Enter macOS Password, then choose an administrator account and enter its password.

    Startup Security Utility

    In the Startup Security Utility:

    • Choose No Security in the Secure Boot section.

    • Choose Allow booting from external media in the External Boot.

    To still protect your Mac from starting on untrusted external media, you can set a firmware password, available on macOS Mountain Lion or later. A firmware password prevents users who do not have the password from starting up from any media other than the designated startup disk.

    If you forget your firmware password you will require an in-person service appointment with an Apple Store or Apple Authorized Service Provider.

    Read more on Apple Support about:

  7. If the computer starts on Tails, the Boot Loader appears and Tails starts automatically after 4 seconds.

    Black screen ('GNU
GRUB') with Tails logo and 2 options: 'Tails' and 'Tails (Troubleshooting

    • The Troubleshooting Mode entry disables some features of the Linux kernel and might work better on some computers. You can try this option if you think you are experiencing hardware compatibility errors while starting Tails.

    • The External Hard Disk entry makes it possible to start from an external hard disk and some problematic USB sticks.


Starting the computer using a Boot Menu key can be faster than starting the computer on Windows first and then on Tails. We recommend you learn how to start Tails using the Boot Menu key if you use Tails regularly.

Apple does not prioritize collaborating with Free Software projects. Their newest hardware is usually very hard for Free Software developers to get working with Linux, and thus Tails. PC hardware tends to be more open and work better with Linux.

Welcome to Tails!

Starting Tails

  1. After the Boot Menu, a loading screen appears.

  2. One to two minutes after the Boot Loader and the loading screen, the Welcome Screen appears.

    Welcome to Tails!

  3. In the Welcome Screen, select your language and keyboard layout in the Language & Region section. Click Start Tails.

    If your keyboard or touchpad doesn't work, try using a USB keyboard or mouse.

  4. Nach 15–30 Sekunden erscheint der Desktop von Tails.

    Tails desktop

Welcome to your new Tails!

Test your Wi-Fi

Problems with Wi-Fi are unfortunately quite common in Tails and Linux in general. To test if your Wi-Fi interface works in Tails:

  1. Open the system menu in the top-right corner:

  2. Choose Wi-Fi Not Connected and then Select Network.

  3. After establishing a connection to a local network, the Tor Connection assistant appears to help you connect to the Tor network.

If your Wi-Fi interface is not working, for example:

  • There is no Wi-Fi option in the system menu:

  • You receive the notification Connection failed: Activation of network connection failed.

  • The interface is disabled when starting Tails or when plugging in your USB Wi-Fi adapter:

    Notification about network card being disabled

    In this case, you can disable MAC address anonymization to get your Wi-Fi interface to work in Tails. Disabling MAC address anonymization has security implications, so read carefully our documentation about MAC address anonymization before doing so.

To connect to the Internet, you can try to:

  • Use an Ethernet cable instead of Wi-Fi if possible. Wired interfaces work much more reliably than Wi-Fi in Tails.

  • Share the Wi-Fi or mobile data connection of your phone using a USB cable. Sharing a connection this way is called USB tethering.

    See instructions for:

    Tails cannot hide the information that identifies your phone on the local network. If you connect your phone to:

    • A Wi-Fi network, then the network will know the MAC address of your phone. This has security implications that are discussed in our documentation on MAC address anonymization. Some phones have a feature to hide the real MAC address of the phone.

    • A mobile data network, then the network will be able to know the identifier of your SIM card (IMSI) and also the serial number of your phone (IMEI).

  • Buy a USB Wi-Fi adapter that works in Tails:

    VendorModelSizeSpeedPriceBuy offlineBuy online
    Panda WirelessUltraNano150 Mbit/s$18NoAmazon
    Panda WirelessPAU05Small300 Mbit/s$65NoAmazon
    ThinkPenguinTPE-N150USBNano150 Mbit/s$74NoThinkPenguin

    If you find another USB Wi-Fi adapter that works in Tails, please let us know. You can write to (private email).

You made it!

You managed to start your new Tails on your computer!

Congratulations on staying safe :)

To continue discovering Tails, read our documentation.