Save your download to your usual Downloads
folder and not to the USB stick.
We recommend that you save your download to your
Persistent Storage. Otherwise, Tails might stop responding if the RAM memory of
the computer gets full.
While you are downloading, we recommend you read the
release notes for Tails
6.6
.
They document all the changes in this new version: new features, problems that
were solved, and known issues that have already been identified.
6.6
Verify your download
Verify your download to make sure that it is safe and was not corrupted during download.
Your BitTorrent client will automatically verify your download when it completes.
The verification below is optional for a BitTorrent download.
You seem to have JavaScript disabled. To verify your download,
you can either:
Most likely, the verification failed because of an error
or interruption during the download.
The verification also fails if you try to verify a different
download than the latest version, Tails
6.6
.
Less likely, the verification might have failed because
of a malicious download from our download mirrors or due to
a network attack in your country or local network.
Downloading again is usually enough to fix this
problem. Otherwise, please try downloading from a different place or a
different computer.
To install or upgrade Tails on a USB stick, download our USB image
instead.
Warnings: Tails is safe but not magic!
Tails is safer than any regular operating system. But Tails, or any
software or operating system, cannot protect you from everything—even if they
pretend to.
The recommendations below will keep you even safer,
especially if you are at high risk.
Protecting your identity when using Tails
Tails is designed to hide your identity.
But some of your activities could reveal
your identity:
Sharing files with metadata, such as date, time, location, and device information
Using Tails for more than one purpose at a time
Limitations of the Tor network
Tails uses the Tor network because it is the strongest and most popular
network to protect from surveillance and censorship.
But Tor has limitations if you are concerned about:
Hiding that you are using Tor and Tails
Protecting your online communications from determined, skilled attackers
Reducing risks when using untrusted computers
Tails can safely run on a computer that has a virus.
But Tails cannot always protect you when:
Installing from an infected computer
Running Tails on a computer with a compromised BIOS, firmware, or hardware
Protecting your identity
Clean metadata from files before sharing them
Many files contain hidden data, or metadata:
JPEG and other image files often contain information about
where a picture was taken and which camera was used.
Office documents often contain information
about their author, and the date and time the document was
created.
To help you clean metadata, Tails include
Metadata Cleaner, a tool to remove metadata
in a wide range of file formats.
If you use Tails sessions for more than one purpose at a time,
an adversary could link your different
activities together.
For example, if you log into different accounts on the same website in a
single Tails session, the website could determine that the accounts
are used by the same person. This is because websites can tell when
2 accounts are using the same Tor circuit.
To prevent an adversary from linking your
activities together while using Tails, restart Tails between
different activities. For example, restart Tails between checking
your work email and your whistleblowing email.
We are not aware of any such attacks to deanonymize people online who
used Tails for different purposes at a time.
If you worry that the files in your Persistent
Storage could be used to link your activities together,
consider using a different Tails USB stick for each activity.
For example, use one Tails USB stick for your activism work and another one
for your journalism work.
Limitations of Tor
Tails makes it clear that you are using Tor and probably Tails
Everything you do on the Internet from Tails goes through the Tor network.
Tor and Tails don't protect you by making you look like any random Internet
user, but by making all Tor and Tails users look the same. It becomes
impossible to know who is who among them.
Your Internet service provider (ISP) and local network can
see that you connect to the Tor network. They still cannot know what sites you visit.
To hide that you connect to Tor, you can use a Tor bridge.
Parental controls, Internet service providers, and countries
with heavy censorship can identify and block connections to the Tor
network that don't use Tor bridges.
Many websites ask you to solve a CAPTCHA or block access from the Tor
network.
Exit nodes can intercept traffic to the destination server
Tor hides your location from destination servers, but it does not encrypt
all your communication. The last relay of a Tor circuit, called the exit node,
establishes the actual connection to the destination server. This last step can
be unencrypted, for example, if you connect to a website using HTTP instead of
HTTPS.
The exit node can:
Observe your traffic. That is why Tor Browser and Tails include tools
to encrypt the connection between the exit node and the
destination server, whenever possible.
Pretend to be the destination server, a technique known as
machine-in-the-middle attack (MitM). That is why you should pay even
more attention to the security warnings in Tor Browser. If you get such
a warning, use the New Identity feature of Tor Browser to
change exit node.
The Tor network has more than 6 000 relays. Organizations running Tor
relays include universities like the MIT, activist groups like Riseup,
nonprofits like Derechos Digitales, Internet hosting companies like Private
Internet Access, and so on. The huge diversity of people and organizations running
Tor relays makes it more secure and more sustainable.
A powerful adversary, who could analyze the timing and shape of the traffic
entering and exiting the Tor network, might be able to deanonymize Tor users.
These attacks are called end-to-end correlation attacks, because the attacker
has to observe both ends of a Tor circuit at the same time.
No anonymity network used for rapid connections, like browsing
the web or instant messaging, can protect 100% from end-to-end correlation
attacks. In this case, VPNs (Virtual Private Networks) are less secure than Tor,
because they do not use 3 independent relays.
Tails protects you from viruses and malware on your usual
operating system. This is because Tails runs independently from other operating systems.
But your Tails might be corrupted if you install from a compromised
operating system. To reduce that risk:
Always install Tails from a trusted operating system.
For example, download Tails on a computer without viruses or clone Tails
from a trusted friend.
Do not plug in your Tails USB stick while another operating
system is running on the computer.
Use your Tails USB stick only to run Tails. Do not use your Tails
USB stick to transfer files to or from another operating system.
If you worry that your Tails might be corrupted, do a manual
upgrade from a trusted operating system.
We don't know of any virus able to infect a Tails
installation, but one could be created in the future.
No operating system can protect against hardware alterations
The computer might be compromised if its physical components have been altered.
For example, if a keylogger has been physically installed on the computer,
your passwords, personal information, and other data typed on the keyboard could
be stored and accessed by someone else, even if you are using Tails.
Try to keep your computer in a safe location. Hardware alterations are more likely on public computers,
in internet cafés or libraries, and on desktop computers, where a device is easier to hide.
If you worry that a computer might be modified:
Use a password manager to
paste saved passwords. This way, you don't have to type passwords that might
be visible to people or cameras near you.
Use the screen keyboard,
if you are using a public computer or worry that the computer might have
a keylogger.
No operating system can protect against BIOS and firmware attacks
Firmware includes the BIOS or UEFI and other software stored in electronic chips on the computer.
All operating systems, including Tails, depend on firmware to start and run, so no operating system
can protect against a firmware attack. In the same way that a car depends on the quality of the road
it is driving on, operating systems depend on their firmware.
Keeping your computer in a safe location can protect against some firmware
attacks, but some other firmware attacks can be performed remotely.
Because you always have to adapt your digital security practices to your specific needs and threats,
we encourage you to learn more by reading the
following guides: