Save your download to your usual Downloads folder and not to the USB
stick.
We recommend that you save your download to your Persistent
Storage. Otherwise, Tails might stop responding if the RAM memory of the
computer gets full.
While you are downloading, we recommend you read the release
notes for Tails
6.6
. They document all the changes in
this new version: new features, problems that were solved, and known issues
that have already been identified.
6.6
Verify your download
Verify your download to make sure that it is safe and was not corrupted
during download.
Your BitTorrent client will automatically verify your download when it
completes.
The verification below is optional for a BitTorrent download.
You seem to have JavaScript disabled. To verify your download, you can
either:
Most likely, the verification failed because of an error or interruption
during the download.
The verification also fails if you try to verify a different download than
the latest version, Tails
6.6
.
Less likely, the verification might have failed because of a malicious
download from our download mirrors or due to a network attack in your
country or local network.
Downloading again is usually enough to fix this problem. Otherwise, please
try downloading from a different place or a different computer.
Tails is safer than any regular operating system. But Tails, or any software
or operating system, cannot protect you from everything—even if they pretend
to.
Poniższe zalecenia pozwolą Ci zachować jeszcze większe bezpieczeństwo,
zwłaszcza jeśli jesteś w grupie wysokiego ryzyka.
Ochrona twojej tożsamości podczas korzystania z Tails
Tails is designed to hide your identity.
But some of your activities could reveal
your identity:
Sharing files with metadata, such as date, time, location, and device information
Using Tails for more than one purpose at a time
Limitations of the Tor network
Tails uses the Tor network because it is the strongest and most popular
network to protect from surveillance and censorship.
But Tor has limitations if you are concerned about:
Hiding that you are using Tor and Tails
Protecting your online communications from determined, skilled attackers
Redukcja ryzyka podczas korzystania z niezaufanych komputerów
Tails can safely run on a computer that has a virus.
But Tails cannot always protect you when:
Installing from an infected computer
Running Tails on a computer with a compromised BIOS, firmware, or hardware
Protecting your identity
Clean metadata from files before sharing them
Many files contain hidden data, or metadata:
JPEG and other image files often contain information about where a picture
was taken and which camera was used.
Office documents often contain information about their author, and the date
and time the document was created.
To help you clean metadata, Tails include Metadata
Cleaner, a tool to remove metadata in
a wide range of file formats.
If you use Tails sessions for more than one purpose at a time, an adversary
could link your different activities together.
For example, if you log into different accounts on the same website in a
single Tails session, the website could determine that the accounts are used
by the same person. This is because websites can tell when 2 accounts are
using the same Tor circuit.
To prevent an adversary from linking your activities together while using
Tails, restart Tails between different activities. For example, restart
Tails between checking your work email and your whistleblowing email.
We are not aware of any such attacks to deanonymize people online who used
Tails for different purposes at a time.
If you worry that the files in your Persistent
Storage could be used to link your activities
together, consider using a different Tails USB stick for each activity. For
example, use one Tails USB stick for your activism work and another one for
your journalism work.
Limitations of Tor
Tails makes it clear that you are using Tor and probably Tails
Everything you do on the Internet from Tails goes through the Tor network.
Tor and Tails don't protect you by making you look like any random Internet
user, but by making all Tor and Tails users look the same. It becomes
impossible to know who is who among them.
Your Internet service provider (ISP) and local network can see that you
connect to the Tor network. They still cannot know what sites you visit. To
hide that you connect to Tor, you can use a Tor
bridge.
Parental controls, Internet service providers, and countries with heavy
censorship can identify and block connections to the Tor network that don't
use Tor bridges.
Many websites ask you to solve a CAPTCHA or block access from the Tor
network.
Exit nodes can intercept traffic to the destination server
Tor hides your location from destination servers, but it does not encrypt
all your communication. The last relay of a Tor circuit, called the
exit node, establishes the actual connection to the destination
server. This last step can be unencrypted, for example, if you connect to a
website using HTTP instead of HTTPS.
The exit node can:
Observe your traffic. That is why Tor Browser and Tails include tools
to encrypt the connection between the exit node and the destination server,
whenever possible.
Pretend to be the destination server, a technique known as
machine-in-the-middle attack (MitM). That is why you should pay even
more attention to the security warnings in Tor Browser. If you get
such a warning, use the New
Identity feature of Tor
Browser to change exit node.
The Tor network has more than 6 000 relays. Organizations running Tor
relays include universities like the MIT, activist groups like Riseup,
nonprofits like Derechos Digitales, Internet hosting companies like Private
Internet Access, and so on. The huge diversity of people and organizations
running Tor relays makes it more secure and more sustainable.
A powerful adversary, who could analyze the timing and shape of the traffic
entering and exiting the Tor network, might be able to deanonymize Tor
users. These attacks are called end-to-end correlation attacks,
because the attacker has to observe both ends of a Tor circuit at the same
time.
No anonymity network used for rapid connections, like browsing the web or
instant messaging, can protect 100% from end-to-end correlation attacks. In
this case, VPNs (Virtual Private Networks) are less secure than Tor, because
they do not use 3 independent relays.
Tails protects you from viruses and malware on your usual operating
system. This is because Tails runs independently from other operating
systems.
But your Tails might be corrupted if you install from a compromised
operating system. To reduce that risk:
Always install Tails from a trusted operating system. For example, download
Tails on a computer without viruses or clone Tails from a trusted friend.
Do not plug in your Tails USB stick while another operating system is
running on the computer.
Use your Tails USB stick only to run Tails. Do not use your Tails USB stick
to transfer files to or from another operating system.
If you worry that your Tails might be corrupted, do a manual
upgrade from a trusted operating system.
We don't know of any virus able to infect a Tails installation, but one
could be created in the future.
No operating system can protect against hardware alterations
The computer might be compromised if its physical components have been
altered. For example, if a keylogger has been physically installed on the
computer, your passwords, personal information, and other data typed on the
keyboard could be stored and accessed by someone else, even if you are using
Tails.
Try to keep your computer in a safe location. Hardware alterations are more
likely on public computers, in internet cafés or libraries, and on desktop
computers, where a device is easier to hide.
If you worry that a computer might be modified:
Use a password manager to
paste saved passwords. This way, you don't have to type passwords that might
be visible to people or cameras near you.
Use the screen keyboard, if you
are using a public computer or worry that the computer might have a
keylogger.
No operating system can protect against BIOS and firmware attacks
Firmware includes the BIOS or UEFI and other software stored in electronic
chips on the computer. All operating systems, including Tails, depend on
firmware to start and run, so no operating system can protect against a
firmware attack. In the same way that a car depends on the quality of the
road it is driving on, operating systems depend on their firmware.
Keeping your computer in a safe location can protect against some firmware
attacks, but some other firmware attacks can be performed remotely.
Ponieważ zawsze trzeba dostosować praktyki bezpieczeństwa cyfrowego do
konkretnych potrzeb i zagrożeń, zachęcamy do zapoznania się z następującymi
przewodnikami: